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Reduction of Damages
Thomas Thiede* and Erdem Büyüksagis**
I. Prelim inary Rem arks
A. Reduction o f Damages in National and European T ort Law
In most European legal systems it is generally acknowledged in national 15/1 
as well as international law that any damage must be restituted com­
pletely,1 as long as the claim is admitted on its merits. If this proposition is 
accepted, the tortfeasor is liable for the complete damage resulting from the 
infringement of rights of the victim,2 ie the victim should, as far as 
possible, be placed in the same position as if the violation of his or her 
rights had not occurred (restitutio ad integrum). However, this principle is 
not enforced fully in any European country or in the European Union.
* Dr iur LLB, LLM, Institute for European Tort Law (ETL), Austrian Academy of Sciences, 
Vienna.
** Associate Prof Dr iur, LLM (Georgetown), Attorney-at-Law, Lecturer at the Master of Laws 
in Cross-Cultural Business Practice (MLCBP), University of Fribourg, Bern and Neuchâ­
tel, Switzerland.
The authors would like to thank Dr iur Helmut Ortner LLM, LLM for his insightful 
comments on an earlier draft of this report.
1 See G Dannemann, Schadensersatz bei Verletzung der Europäischen Menschenrechts­
konvention (1994) 23 2 ; U Magnus, Comparative Report on the Law of Damages, in: 
U Magnus (ed), Unification of Tort Law: Damages (2001) no 2  ff. However, it has to be 
noted that in many European countries the extent of compensation depends on the 
degree of fault. In Austria, for instance, see § 1324  Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetz­
buch (Austrian Civil Code, ABGB). If the tortfeasor acted with slight negligence, then  
the victim is entitled to the actual loss. The tortfeasor is only liable for full compensa­
tion (actual loss and loss of profits) if he behaved with gross negligence or intent. See 
H  Koziol, Damages under Austrian Law, in: Magnus (supra) nos 3, 5.
2  However, in the given context one should remember that compensation should restore 
the victim only to the position he would have been in had the infringement of human  
rights not occurred. Hence, any benefit to the victim resulting from the payment of any 
compensation by the State must be refused. On the other hand, we recognize that, in 
many cases, it is not so easy to determine what the victim’s situation would have been if 
the violation of his or her rights had not occurred. Concerning this issue, see E Büyüksagis, 
Yeni Sosyo-Ekonomik Boyutuyla Maddi Zarar Kavrami [Material Loss in Light of Recent 
Socio-Economic Developments] (2007).
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Instead it seems characteristic in many jurisdictions that damages may be 
reduced albeit the liability on the merits has already been established.
15/2 Generally, two different legal approaches to the reduction of damages can 
be observed. Firstly, concepts such as the adequacy of damage, the protec­
tive scope of a provision and the contributory fault of the victim are often 
responsible for an eventual reduction -  albeit that they separately fulfill 
different functions within the universe of tort law. One may label this as 
assessment of damages. Secondly, a series of countries have codified a 
general reduction clause, often in addition to the various concepts men­
tioned above, and a list of countries, including Denmark,3 Finland,4 the 
Netherlands,5 Portugal,6 Sweden,7 Spain,8 Poland,9 Switzerland,10 Tur­
key,11 and the draft of a new Austrian Tort Law12 have all developed 
provisions to take into account the economic capacity of the tortfeasor 
additionally as a further factor for reducing damages.
15/3 Accordingly, the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL)13 generally accept in 
art 10:101 PETL a restitutio ad integrum14 but state additionally in art 8:101 
PETL that liability can be excluded or reduced to such extent as is 
considered just having regard to the victim’s contributory fault and to 
any other matters, eg foreseeability of the damage and the nature and the 
value of the protected interests (art 3:201 PETL), which would be relevant 
to establish or reduce liability if the victim were the tortfeasor. In addi­
tion, PETL allow in art 10:401 (1) that damages may be reduced in 
exceptional cases, for instance if in light of the financial situation of the 
parties, compensation would be an oppressive burden to the defendant.
3 S 19 Erstatningsansvarloven (Damages Act, 88S/200S).
4  Ch 2  S 1 Vahingonkorvauslaki (Tort Liability Act, 412/1974).
5 Art 6 :109 Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek (New Civil Code, 1992).
6 Art 4 9 4  Código Civil (Civil C ode,1966-344)
7 Ch 6 S 2  Skadestandslag (Tort Act, 1972:207).
8 Art 1103 Código Civil (Civil Code, 1889).
9 Art 440  Kodeks cywilny (Civil Code, no 16 item 93/1964).
10 Art 44  (2) Code des obligations suisse (Swiss Code of Obligations, SwCo 220/1911).
11 Art 52  (2) Türk Borçlar Kanunu (Turkish Code of Obligations, TBK 6098/2011), which 
will take effect on 1st July 2012.
12 See S 1318 of the Draft, Juristische Blätter (JBl) 2 0 0 8 ,3 6 5  =  Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht 
(ZVR) 2008 , 168. On the draft see E Karner, Geldersatz für ideelle Schäden, Minderung 
der Ersatzpflicht, Beweislast, Verjährung, in: I Griss/G Kathrein/H Koziol (eds), Entwurf 
eines neuen österreichischen Schadenersatzrechts (2006) 89 ff; BC Steininger, Austria, in: 
H Koziol/BC Steininger (eds), European Tort Law 2005 (2006) 118 ff.
13 European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law, Text and Commentary 
(2005) ongoing.
14 See U Magnus, Commentary ad art 10:101 PETL, in: European Group on Tort Law (fn 13) 
no 7.
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Even in European Community law, tendencies towards the reduction of 15/4 
damages are noticeable. In the first instance, a reference to the law of the 
European Union appears astonishing, since art 340 (2) Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) merely states that, in the 
case of non-contractual liability, the Community shall, in accordance 
with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, 
compensate any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in 
the performance of their duties. On the basis of this provision, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has developed case law concerning the 
law of damages, basing its decisions on the principles inherent in the 
European legal systems. As part of this, the topic of reduction of 
damages was dealt with in the judgments Oleifici Mediterranei v EEC15 
and Ireks-Arkady v Council and Commission.16 The Court held that in general 
the reduction of damages is part of the acquis communitaire and that, for 
example, damages should at least be reduced in cases where the injured 
person has contributed to the damage by their own unlawful behav­
iour;17 a further reference to reduction due to the economic situation of 
the tortfeasor was not made.
B. Principles Governing the Reduction o f Damages
Because all of these approaches to reducing damages are exceptions to the 15/5 
principle of full compensation, they require further justification. Two 
different principles which fulfil this function can be identified: reduction 
demanded by corrective justice and reduction demanded by distributive 
justice.18 Both principles may be found to justify reducing damages;
15 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 26 /81 , SA Oleifici Mediterranei v European Economic 
Community [1982] European Court Reports (ECR) 3057 , 3078  f.
16 ECJ 2 3 8 /78 , Ireks-Arkady Gmbh v Council and Commission of the European Communities [1979] 
ECR 2955 , 2974.
17 See ECJ 26 /81 , Oleifici Mediterranei v EEC [1982] ECR 3057 , 3078  f.
18 In general see DB Dobbs, Direct and General Limits on Tort Damages in the United 
States, in: J Spier (ed), The Limits of Liability: Keeping the Floodgates Shut (1996) 35; 
Restatement Second of Torts § 435 (1) (1965).
In cases where the reduction finds its grounds in the relationship between claimant and 
defendant, the reduction is justified by corrective justice. Corrective justice takes into 
account only the harmful action at hand and not the financial circumstances of the 
parties. Examples of corrective justice are reduction based on the applicant’s contribu­
tory negligence or the low degree of the defendant’s fault. In contrast, distributive 
justice observes the situation of the litigating parties, eg their age or financial situation, 
and it analyses the effects damages would have on them. See F Bydlinski, Juristische 
Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff (1991) 357  ff and 339  f; K Larenz/C-W Canaris, Metho­
denlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (3rd edn 1995) 168 ff, 2 0 2  ff; W Fikentscher, Methoden
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however, the methodological grounds for reduction are not always ex­
plicitly connected to one principle or the other. Explicit justification is 
more likely only where existing national law does not provide any existing 
guidance thus forcing literature and courts to set out their reasoning. 
Academic literature and national courts usually refer to other considera­
tions, for instance arguing that harm has partly been caused by external 
factors outside of the defendant’s sphere, that the extent of damage was 
not foreseeable,19 that there was only slight negligence on the part of the 
defendant, that the defendant enjoys the special protection of the law (eg 
children and mentally impaired people),20 that the defendant had acted 
with altruistic motives21 or that the imposition of full liability would ruin 
the defendant.22
II. Analysis of the ECtHR Jurisprudence
15/6 In the following, the authors generally apply a broader perspective, ie 
seek to identify some of the above-mentioned justifications for reduction 
in the ECtHR’s case law.23 However, the authors also want to emphasize 
that the general weight given to any particular justification or principle 
may be minimal, with the more likely scenario seeming to be that any 
interpretations are only valid in relation to the given facts of the par­
ticular case. The following indications of how damages are subject 
to reduction within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human
des Rechts in vergleichender Darstellung, vol III: Mitteleuropäischer Rechtskreis (1976) 
651 ff.
The notion of corrective justice has been criticized on the ground that it provides no 
practical guidelines for providing only normative guidance and failing to accommodate 
what the tort law actually says. In A Ripstein/BC Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of 
Mass Tort, in: GJ Postema (ed), Philosophy and the Law of Torts (2001) 2 1 4  ff, these 
ideas are explicitly dealt with and refuted.
19 See in Germany Reichsgericht (RG) in Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 
(RGZ) 1 5 5 ,3 7 ; Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) in Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in 
Zivilsachen (BGHZ) 20 , 137 (139); BGHZ 107, 359 (363); BGH Neue Juristische Wo­
chenschrift (NJW) 1974, 1510. Concerning the questions about the limitation of liabil­
ity, see W Wilburg, Die Elemente des Schadensrechts (1941) 2 4 2  ff; F  Bydlinski, Probleme 
der Schadensverursachung (1964) 62.
20 In general see M Martin-Casals, Comparative Report, in: M Martin-Casals (ed), Children 
in Tort Law, Part I: Children as Tortfeasors (2006) no 1.
21 See F  Werro, La responsabilité civile (2005) no 1147.
22  See WVH Rogers/J Spier/G Viney, Observations, in: Spier (fn 18) 10; Werro (fn 21) no 1140.
23 For an extensive analysis as to what is deemed by the ECtHR to be damage and in what 
cases damages are awarded, see K Oliphant/K Ludwichowska, Damage (contained in this 
volume) nos 6 /18  ff; C Kissling/D Kelliher, Compensation for Pecuniary and Non-Pecuni- 
ary Loss (contained in this volume) no 11/13 ff all with extensive further references.
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Rights (ECtHR) are not suitable for precise dogmatic analysis. Hence, 
different interpretations are up for debate:24 in the following, the 
authors attempt to present more than one perspective.
Despite these different stances, it was generally agreed that the most 
striking feature of the case law described below is the fact that the ECtHR 
neither deals explicitly with the reduction of damages nor unpacks the 
underlying criteria, whilst obviously applying such reductions in many 
cases; there is very miniscule indication of how the amounts awarded were 
calculated, which makes it difficult to draw conclusions regarding when 
and why damages were reduced.25
To begin with, the Court observes the principle of full reparation; under 15/7 
art 41 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), damages 
can only be awarded when the national tort law of the High Contracting 
Party fails to provide full compensation for the damage incurred.26 How­
ever, the fact that merely partial as opposed to complete restitution is the 
basis for the ECtHR’s competence to award damages does not mean that 
the Court must award the amount of the shortfall from full compensation 
under the national law -  the incompleteness of the restitution is only the 
starting point in deciding whether a claim is admissible and proper.
Art 41 ECHR itself does not require that the Court instead of the State 
should award the shortfall from full reparation. It only foresees ‘just 
satisfaction’. Hence, it is clearly also foreseen that this just satisfaction 
may be less than the full amount of damage.27
This departure from the starting point of total reparation requires special 15/8 
reasoning, which regrettably is often not tackled prominently but only 
incidentally addressed under certain terms such as ‘equity’, ‘just satisfac­
tion’, the ‘missing causal link’ or the ‘nature of the proceedings in the case’.
When examining the judgments of the ECtHR, one must assume that these 
keywords are used as a substitute for different considerations.28 Compared
24  See A Fenyves, Concluding Remarks on Contributory Negligence and Reduction Clause 
(contained in this volume) no 23/5  ff.
25 Nevertheless, we hope to ascertain principles regarding the reduction of damages by 
applying a teleological argumentation based on the fundamental purpose of the Con­
vention, ie effective hum an rights’ protection and just satisfaction for the applicant. See 
F  Bydlinski, Methodological Approaches to the Tort Law of the ECHR (contained in this 
volume) no 2/55.
26 See Bydlinski (fn 25) no 2/20.
27  See ibid, no 2 /24  ff.
28 See, eg, the recent decision ECtHR Svetlana Orlova v. Russia, 30 .7 .2009, no. 4487/04, § 58: 
‘The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage as a 
result of the unreasonably long examination of her claims by domestic courts. However,
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to the very precise and extended analysis leading to the establishment of an 
infringement of human rights, the questions of the liability consequences 
under art 41 are dealt with in quite a brief manner. In some cases the Court 
justified the granting of compensation as well as its calculation therefore 
only by referring to ‘equity’, although the plaintiff did not even specify the 
amount of the damages claimed.29 Potential factors for calculating reduc­
tion are not elaborated on in greater detail and only the afore-mentioned 
aphorisms are given as the criteria for the assessment of damages.
A. Incapacity and Vis M aior
1. Assanidze v. Georgia [GC]30
15/9 In this case the violation of the Convention had indisputably caused the 
applicant substantial damage. The Court held that the founding princi­
ples of the rule of law were breached and that the applicant was in a 
frustrating situation that he was powerless to rectify.
the amount claimed appears to be excessive. Having regard to the nature of the proceed­
ings in the present case and ruling on an equitable basis, it awards her EUR 2 ,100’.
29 See recently ECtHR Ong c. France, 14 .11 .2006 , no. 348 /03 , §§ 4 7 -4 9 . In this case, the 
plaintiff argued that the damage he suffered was so severe and so widespread that it was 
not possible for him to estimate its exact extent. The government replied that the claim  
should be refused as inadmissible since the plaintiff was not able to prove his damage.
30 ECtHR 8 .4 .2004 , no. 71503/01 . The applicant, Tengiz Assanidze, was a Georgian 
national who was in custody in Batumi, the capital city of the Ajarian Autonomous 
Republic in Georgia. He was accused of illegal financial dealings in the Batumi Tobacco 
Manufacturing Company and of unlawful possession and handling of firearms. In 1994  
he was convicted and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment; his assets were confis­
cated and he was required to reimburse the pecuniary losses of the tobacco company. On 
1 October 1999, the applicant was granted a presidential pardon but he was not released 
because the Ajarian High Court declared the pardon null and void. In 1999, the 
applicant was charged with further criminal offences concerning a separate case of 
kidnapping. On 2  October 2000 , the applicant was convicted and sentenced to twelve 
years’ imprisonment. On 29 January 2 001 , the Supreme Court of Georgia heard the 
applicant’s appeal. Its verdict resulted in the acquittal of the applicant and order of his 
immediate release. In spite of all this, the applicant remained in custody in the Ajarian 
Autonomous Republic. The applicant complained about the violation of his right to 
liberty, since he continued to remain in the custody of the Ajarian Autonomous 
Republic in spite of the fact that he had received a presidential pardon for his first 
offence and been acquitted of the second offence by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The 
applicant claimed reparation for pecuniary damage: for the loss of his monthly income, 
€ 12,000  and for non-pecuniary damage € 3 ,000 ,000 . The State of Georgia submitted 
that it was not able to enforce either the Supreme Court’s order or the presidential 
pardon and was therefore generally not able to free the applicant from custody in the 
Ajarian Autonomous Republic.
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Theoretically, the ECtHR could then have awarded damages under the 
heads of pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. Regrettably, however, the Court 
did not separate its awards into these respective heads of damages: concern­
ing the applicant’s pecuniary loss, the Court mentioned that it had been 
unable to make a precise calculation and therefore fell to an assessment in 
equity for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, which were 
awarded as a global sum of € 150,000 to cover all of the applicant’s losses.
Obviously, there must have been a certain reduction of damages in this 
case: the Court awarded just 5 % of the damages requested. However, any 
examination of the evident reduction proves rather difficult since the 
Court provides no guidance as to which basis was relevant in reducing 
the damages so severely.31 The Court apparently preferred a more intui­
tive assessment without highlighting the material circumstances leading 
to the reduction. The fact that the compensation was awarded for both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage leads to further difficulties since the 
different items cannot be distinguished in a uniform sum.
Certainly of more interest in the context of this report is the indirect 15/10 
reference by the State of Georgia to the idea of corrective justice. The State 
invoked the defence that the executive was simply not able to enforce the 
judgments delivered by the Supreme Court. Since the damage was caused 
directly by the Ajarian authorities, it was implied that there was not any 
fault on the part of the State.32 The Court held that the State is liable for 
damage caused by subordinate authorities and the infringement of the 
victim’s rights under the Convention is the sole basis for the State’s 
liability.33 Thus, based on the (particular) absence of any consideration 
of fault on the side of the State with respect to the establishment of 
liability, the denial of a defence of unenforceability was inevitable; if the 
State’s liability generally does not depend on its faulty behaviour, any
31 In a more recent case involving the violation of art 8 ECHR, the ECtHR awarded € 6 ,000, 
whereas the plaintiff had claimed 8 million Slovakian korunas (approx € 265,000) in 
non-pecuniary damages. In other words, the Court awarded just 2 .2 6  % of the damages 
claimed. However, it did not provide any special reasoning for such a reduction. For this 
case, see ECtHR Kucera v. Slovakia, 17 .7 .2007 , no. 4 8 666 /99 , §§ 3 6 -3 8 . For recent similar 
cases, see Stankov v. Bulgaria, 12 .7 .2007 , no. 68490 /01 , §§ 6 9 -7 1 ; Nest’dk v. Slovakia, 
27 .2 .2 0 0 7 , no. 65559 /01 , §§ 1 0 4 -1 0 6 .
32  Furthermore, the State requested that the Court restrict the damages for pecuniary 
damage to a reasonable level because the claim was grossly exaggerated and also in view 
of its severe socio-economic crisis and financial situation, which would make it impos­
sible to pay out large sums to the applicant over any length of time. This is of course a 
reference to distributive justice. See no 15/5 ff above and no 15/12  ff below.
33 See BC Steininger/N Wallner-Friedl, Wrongfulness and Fault (contained in this volume) 
no 8/21 ff; D Hinghofer-Szalkay/BA Koch, No-Fault or Strict Liability (contained in this 
volume) no 10/13 ff; Dannemann (fn 1) 84 ff; Bydlinski (fn 25) no 2/58  ff.
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absence of fault cannot be deemed a defence. Therefore, the Court made it 
absolutely clear that any incapacity of a State to perform its duties under 
the Convention is not regarded a defence.
15/11 Apparently the Court delivered this with good grounds. Beyond the clear 
inability to provide a satisfactory level of human rights protection, the 
State failed to allocate the necessary funds and personnel to enforce its 
legal decisions. It is to be assumed prima facie that an appropriate funding 
of the tasks necessary for human rights’ protection would have been 
possible. One may assume that the Court refers to an abstract possibility 
to provide the agreed protection.34
2. Mykhaylenky and Others v. Ukraine35
15/12 In significant contrast to the case described above, where the incapacity 
of the State was clearly no defence since there were several possible ways 
to raise the necessary funds and, hence, there was an abstract possibility 
of human rights protection, the Mykhaylenky case should perhaps be 
assessed in the context of its history, which is the Chernobyl disaster of 
1986. One should bear in mind that this catastrophe, which occurred in a 
Ukrainian nuclear power plant, is widely regarded as the worst accident 
in the history of nuclear power. As a result, one reactor was completely 
destroyed and large areas within Europe became contaminated with 
radiation. Over time the incidence of different types of cancer has risen 
greatly in the Ukraine and neighbouring Belarus, onto which a vast 
amount of nuclear fallout rained. In addition to the fatal effects on the 
population’s health, the economic situation of the Ukraine declined 
tremendously, mainly due to the shutdown of the remaining working
34  See also Fenyves (fn 24) no 23 /10  f.
35 ECtHR 30 .11 .2004 , nos. 3 5 091 /02 , 3 5 196 /02 , 3 5 2 0 1 /0 2 ,3 5 2 0 4 /0 2 , 3 5945 /02 , 35949 /02 , 
3 5 953 /02 , 3 6 800 /02 , 38 2 9 6 /0 2  and 42814 /02 . In the Mykhaylenky case, 11 Ukrainian 
nationals complained about the non-enforcement of individual court decisions enjoin­
ing the state-owned company Atomspetsbud to pay them salary arrears. Atomspetsbud 
was the company running the reactors in Chernobyl and the applicants carried out 
construction work at Chernobyl within the zone that had been compulsorily evacuated. 
In June 1999, the Ministry of Energy informed the applicants that the delay in payment 
of salary arrears was due to the debtor company’s difficult economic situation, caused by 
the failure of third parties to pay their debts to the company. In 2001 it transpired that 
the Ministry for Emergencies and the Protection of the Population from the Conse­
quences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe was the company’s largest debtor and, due to the 
above described economic reasons, not able to pay the remaining amounts to the 
applicants. See also ECtHR Sharenok v. Ukraine, 22 .2 .2 0 0 5 , no. 3 5 087 /02 , § 15; Hinghofer- 
Szalkay/Koch (fn 33) no 10/8.
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reactors, industry being cut off from energy supplies, and, of course, the 
enormous medical expenses for the Ukrainians exposed to radiation. As 
a result of this catastrophe, the State of Ukraine lost a total of between 
approximately $ 120 billion and $ 130 billion -  a sum six times greater 
than its annual budget.36
In its decision, the Court did not weigh the fact that the Ukraine suffered 
(and is still suffering) severe economic difficulties due to the Chernobyl 
catastrophe and reiterated in this decision once again that a State author­
ity’s lack of funds can not excuse the non-enforcement of a court decision, 
in this case the non-payment of the salaries.
On the face of it, one has to affirm this judgment since the infringed 15/13 
guarantee of the rule of law naturally extends to judgments delivered by 
the national court. Moreover, the enforcement of the various court deci­
sions required the State to pay only € 14,366 to satisfy the claims of the 11  
applicants. For a State to pay such a sum cannot be considered an 
oppressive burden. Last but not least, this decision of the Court is 
evidently influenced by the idea that certain principles such as the non­
admissibility of the defence of severe economic burden should be up- 
held.37
Nevertheless, catastrophic circumstances like the Chernobyl incident 15/14 
and the lack of even an abstract possibility to protect human rights (eg 
by allocating the necessary funds) in such extreme circumstances should 
be taken into account since the Court’s rigidity is not required (to this 
extent) by art 41 ECHR.38 By all means, one has to bear in mind that 
neither the victim nor the tortfeasor had any influence on that tragic 
event. In contrast to the Assanidze v. Georgia [GC] case, where the Georgian 
Government at least had the abstract and general possibility and the 
time to raise the funds necessary to enforce the decisions of the Supreme 
Court, in the Mykhaylenky and Others v. Ukraine case the full catastrophic 
circumstances appeared from one day to the next and are still causing 
economic turmoil.
In short, in cases of absolutely unforeseen and unavoidable external 15/15 
catastrophes (force majeure), an exception from the rule that lack of money 
or the absence of personnel resources is not a defence should be estab-
36 Cf <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/w orld/m onitoring/83969.stm >.
37  However, it may be noted that the Court does not apply a very strict doctrine of 
precedent, though as a m atter of practice it will generally regard itself as bound by its 
case law.
38 See Bydlinski (fn 25) no 2/213.
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lished, allowing the consideration of an abstract possibility to provide 
human rights protection and, hence, of such external and natural events 
as a weighting factor for the reduction of damages; thus allowing such to 
be invoked as a reason justifying the reduction of a claim already estab­
lished on its merits.39
B. Benefits Received and Risks Taken
15/16 While it has been suggested above that there is no prerequisite of fault 
with respect to the State’s conduct, the Court actually does refer to the 
concept where such conduct was actually offensive. In Smith and Grady v. 
the United Kingdom,40 the Court explicitly took into account the respon­
dent’s behaviour (the United Kingdom), in particular its ‘especially grave 
interferences with the applicant’s private lives’. Hence, the Court’s decision as 
to the appropriate level of just satisfaction was influenced by its view of 
the conduct of the respondent State. The detailed submissions41 concern­
ing pecuniary losses were examined, however the Court reduced the 
award of damages significantly and held furthermore that any amount 
awarded would necessarily be speculative.42
The wording of the decision in the context of the damages awarded in this 
case begs multiple observations: to begin with, the grave fault of the 
respondent State is taken into account (wording) -  nevertheless, the 
amount of damages awarded to the applicants is reduced significantly 
(numbers).
39 See art 10:401 PETL and no 15/3 above.
40 ECtHR 25 .7 .2 0 0 0 , nos. 33985 /96  and 33986 /96 . The applicants, Jeanette Smith and 
Graeme Grady, were members of the United Kingdom armed forces. Despite their very 
good service records, they were administratively discharged on the basis of the Ministry 
of Defence policy of excluding homosexuals from the armed forces. In November 1995, 
the Court of Appeal rejected their judicial review applications. The applicants claimed 
£  3 0 ,000  and £  20 ,000  respectively for non-pecuniary damage. The ECtHR awarded 
£  19,000  to each applicant on an equitable basis.
41 Both applicants made detailed submissions concerning pecuniary losses. The first 
applicant claimed compensation for both past and future pecuniary losses, in each case 
based on the difference between her civilian income and her service income, as well as 
for loss in respect of her service pension, in total £  590 ,222 . The second applicant 
claimed compensation for future pecuniary loss, since his service earnings would have 
exceeded his potential civilian income, and also for loss related to the service pension 
scheme, in total £  784 ,714 .
42  Therefore, it fell back to an assessment on an equitable basis and awarded the first 
applicant £  59 ,000 compensation for pecuniary damage and the second applicant 
£  4 0 ,000  for pecuniary damage.
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The latter may be explained by the fact that compensation for pecuniary 15/17 
loss was reduced because the victims had already been granted a certain 
amount of money for their pension. Although the Court did not explic­
itly say so, one has to assume that the applicants saw their claim for 
pecuniary loss reduced because of these benefits received.43 This percep­
tion fits in with the above-mentioned interpretation of art 41 ECHR: the 
Court shall not simply award the shortfall from full reparation. It only 
foresees ‘just satisfaction’ as compensation where this is deemed neces­
sary.44
Another possible explanation for this severe reduction might be that the 15/18 
Court had taken into account the fact that, on their enlistment, the 
applicants were aware of the risk of being discharged from the armed 
forces on the ground of their homosexuality in pursuance of the relevant 
official policy of the Ministry of Defence, which had been brought to their 
attention.45
C. Contributory Conduct o r Activity46
In the European civil law systems it is widely accepted that to the extent to 15/19 
which damage cannot be imputed to third parties, the victim must bear 
the loss himself.47 Generally, the contributory conduct or activity of the 
victim leads to a reduction of the sum of damages that would be awarded 
if the victim contributed to the damage or to its aggravation. Therefore, 
the normal apportionment procedure is, first, to establish the victim’s full 
damage and then to reduce it in proportion to the victim’s contribution.
This regularly results in a certain percentage by which the original
43 See Dannemann (fn 1) 226  ff.
44  No 15/7 above.
45 See the partly dissenting and partly concurring opinion of Judge Loucaides in this 
decision.
46 It should be remarked that the term ‘negligence’ is misleading in this context since the 
conduct of the victim cannot be properly qualified as ‘fault’ or ‘negligence’ in a strict 
technical sense, since no one is under a legal duty not to cause damage to his or her own 
sphere. See M Martm-Casals, Contributory Conduct or Activity, in: European Group on 
Tort Law (fn 13) no 8.
47  This rule stems from the old Roman rule ex culpa sua which attributed the harm to the 
victim when the victim has contributed by his own act or omission to the creation or the 
extent of the damage. See KD Kerameus, Contributory Negligence under Greek Law, in: 
U Magnus/M Martin-Casals (eds), Unification of Tort Law: Contributory Negligence 
(2003) no 2  and U Magnus/M Martm-Casals, Comparative Conclusions, in: Magnus/ 
Martin-Casals (supra) no 2.
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amount of damages is reduced, but may also result in total exclusion of 
any compensation.48
1. Rehbock v. Slovenia and Wenerski v. Poland49
15/20 In Rehbock v. Slovenia,50 the Court referred convincingly and explicitly to 
contributory conduct, namely the applicant’s refusal to consent to the 
recommended and necessary treatment for his injuries and accordingly 
reduced the award for damages to 1/40 of the sum claimed by the 
applicant for non-pecuniary damage and thus granted -  compared to the 
original claim -  a more or less symbolic sum. Hence, the Court recognises 
contributory conduct as a ground for reduction.
15/21 On the other hand, the fact that, in some similar cases, the Court similarly 
reduced the award of damages to a considerable extent, without mention­
ing the victim’s contributory conduct as a reason for reduction raises some 
reservations as to the cogency of this approach. For example, in a recent 
case with eminently comparable facts, Wenerski v. Poland, the Court stated 
that
‘... the applicant was not provided with adequate medical assistance 
while he was detained for a period of six years, although such assistance 
had been found to be urgent and necessary. The Court has further 
found that this must have undoubtedly caused him both physical and 
mental suffering. In consequence, ruling on an equitable basis, as 
required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards the appli­
cant EUR 3,000.’
48 See Martm-Casals (fn 46) no 18.
49 ECtHR Rehbock v. Slovenia, 28 .1 1 .2 0 0 0 , no. 29462 /95  and Wenerski v. Poland, 2 0 .1 .2009 , 
no. 44369/02 .
50 The applicant, Ernst Rehbock, is a German national who was arrested by the Slovenian 
police and accused of dealing with narcotics and smuggling. He complained to the 
Court about the treatment he received at the time of his arrest, which resulted in a 
double fracture of the jaw and facial contusions, injuries that were diagnosed by a 
doctor the day following his arrest. He also complained about the lack of adequate 
medical care during his detention, about the length of the proceedings to determine the 
lawfulness of his detention, about the breach of his right to compensation in this respect 
and about the monitoring of his correspondence with the ECtHR. During the proceed­
ings before the Court it became obvious that the applicant had refused to undergo the 
recommended surgery for his injury and that the detention by the Slovenian officials 
was legal since the applicant was convicted of the criminal charges against him  and it 
was alleged that the applicant’s injuries resulted from his own violent resistance at the 
time of his arrest. Nevertheless, in the view of the Court the government failed to satisfy 
the burden of proof that the use of force was not excessive and thus force was justified.
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It is worth mentioning that the original claim was € 30,000. In the 
decision, there is no explanation for such a considerable reduction, which 
is rather peculiar given the fact that the Court had thoroughly highlighted 
the merits of the claim.51
2. Sabin Popescu c. Roumanie52
In the case of Popescu the evaluation of the Court’s decision in ‘equity’53 15/22 
was ambivalent: on the one hand, it openly refused to compensate the 
applicant for the fact that he had not received the original plots of land.
On the other, it granted compensation for the loss of earnings (lucrum 
cessans) due to non-production, rejecting the government’s argument that 
this loss was a result of the applicant’s own conduct in not cultivating the 
land.54
With respect to this decision, it must be stressed that contributory conduct 15/23 
is not limited only to cases where the victim contributed to the creation of 
the damage, but also extends to cases where the damage is aggravated 
through the victim’s conduct after its occurrence.55 Therefore a certain 
reduction -  even to the extent of complete exclusion -  of damages might 
have been indicated, since the applicant clearly contributed to the harm to 
a very large extent and obviously took no precaution to minimize the loss 
at hand.
51 ECtHR Wenerski v. Poland, 20 .1 .2 0 0 9 , no. 4 4 269 /02 , § 84.
52 ECtHR 2 .3 .2 0 0 4 , no. 48102/99.T he applicant, Sabin Popescu, is a Romanian national 
who complained about the non-execution of a definitive court ruling. On 20  March 
1992, the first instance court of Craiova had granted the applicant the right to be given a 
certain plot of land. At the applicant’s request, on 11 June 1992, the court rectified a few 
mistakes, specifying the size and the precise location of the two plots of land to be given 
to the applicant. When he requested the enforcement of the judgm ent, the local 
commission did not give him the two plots of land mentioned in the judgm ent but 
instead offered him a single plot of land of the same total dimensions located 70 meters 
from the 2  plots claimed. The applicant refused to take possession of this on the ground 
that it was not what the judgm ent specified. Nevertheless, a valid property title was 
sent, which the applicant returned. Seeking the execution of the original judgm ent, the 
applicant 1) filed an administrative litigation action, 2) filed a penal complaint for non­
execution of a court ruling and 3) filed various other complaints with various author­
ities. The respondent State submitted that the applicant was not given the plots he 
claimed due to some changes in the land register and that the plot given was of the same 
size and same soil quality as the plots originally awarded. Moreover, the respondent 
State argued that the applicant would not have suffered any loss if he had accepted the 
new plot and cultivated it.
53 For further discussion concerning the notion of ‘equity’, see no 15/8 ff above.
54 Which was criticized by Judge Mularoni in the very same judgment.
55 See Magnus/Martin-Casals (fn 47) no 9 with extensive further reference.
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15/24 Admittedly, another argument may be brought forward in favour of the 
applicant. As shown above,56 the rule of law seems to be one of the absolute 
standards upheld by the Court and in this case no Romanian judgment was 
delivered stating that the replacement of the original plots of land was 
authorized and legal. Any failure to minimize a loss incurred can lead either 
to the exclusion of compensation for any loss deriving from the lack of 
mitigation,57 or to an apportionment of the aggravated part of damage.58 In 
this case the Court chose the second consequence. But even considering this, 
one has to admit that the different items of the applicant’s loss might have 
been mistaken since the actual injury was the non-delivery of the original 
plot of land and not the lack of use of the substitute plot. Hence, if the 
applicant had to be compensated at all, it should have been for the replace­
ment of and loss of the income from the original plots of land.
3. Musiat v. Poland [GC]59
15/25 In Musiat v. Poland [GC] -  in which the applicant initially refused a 
psychological examination to be released from detention -  the Court 
considered that one year eight months and eight days is not compatible 
with the notion of speedy judicial review and no exceptional grounds (like
56 See no 15/13 above.
57 Such an approach was obviously rejected by the Court, but is accepted as a principle in 
Austria, Switzerland, and Turkey. In Austrian law, see M Hinteregger, Contributory 
Negligence under Austrian Law, in: Magnus/Martin-Casals (fn 47) no 13 ff; in Swiss 
law, see Werro (fn 21) no 827; in Turkish law, see E Büyüksagis, Die Haftung aus 
unerlaubter Handlung im Entwurf eines neuen türkischen Obligationenrechts, Haf­
tung und Versicherung/Responsabilite et Assurances (HAVE/REAS) 2006 , 338. For 
further explanations, particularly in English law, see WVH Rogers, Contributory Negli­
gence under English Law, in: Magnus/Martin-Casals (fn 47) no 9.
58 See Magnus/Martin-Casals (fn 47) no 9.
59 ECtHR 25.3 .1999, no. 24557/94. The applicant, Zbigniew Musial, is a Polish national who 
had been found not criminally responsible during the criminal proceedings for his wife’s 
manslaughter. As he was considered a threat to public order, he was detained in a 
psychiatric hospital. He filed several requests to be discharged, which were all refused. 
On 16 March 1993, the applicant’s lawyer filed another request for his client to be 
discharged and insisted that Musial should be examined, not by experts from the hospital 
where he was in detention, but by psychiatrists from the University of Cracow. These 
psychiatrists received Musial’s file in September 1993 and examined him from 31 January 
1994 to 4  February 1994. Their report of 30 November 1994 stated that the reasons for 
which the claimant had been committed to a psychiatric institution were still evident and 
that, as a result, his condition required his further detention. On the basis of this medical 
opinion, the Katowice Regional Court decided on 9 January 1995 that the applicant could 
not be released from psychiatric detention. The applicant complained to the Court that the 
proceedings to review his psychiatric detention were unreasonably long and that his right 
to a speedy judicial decision about the lawfulness of his detention had been breached.
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the initial refusal of the applicant) justify it. The Court added that national 
authorities could not be absolved from their obligations by the complexity 
of a medical case.60 The applicant claimed a total of $ 1,500,000 for 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss, but his claim for pecuniary loss was 
severely reduced: the Court accepted he suffered non-pecuniary loss as a 
result of the length of the proceedings and thus awarded Polish zlotys 
15,000 (approx $ 5,200) on an equitable basis, taking into account the 
circumstances of the case.
Compared to the original claim, one has to assume that a reduction was 
initially based on the fact that the applicant could not have suffered severe 
pecuniary loss since he was to stay in custody in any case -  and his request 
for non-pecuniary loss appeared excessive on the very same ground. 
Furthermore, he contributed to his injuries by refusing the psychological 
examination.
Nevertheless, a possible reduction based on contributory negligence in this 15/26 
case seems problematic: at first glance, a reference to contributory conduct 
may be seen as a double standard in cases of victims who, according to the 
general rules, could not be liable due to their lack of tortious capacity.61 
However, the concept of tortious capacity must not be confused with the 
principles of contributory conduct: the commonly used term contributory 
‘negligence’ is therefore misleading in this context since the conduct of the 
victim cannot properly be qualified as ‘fault’ or ‘negligence’ in a strictly 
technical sense.62 Hence, in most countries,63 rules provide that mentally 
incapacitated persons may be held liable when this is required by fairness64 
or at the discretion of the courts.65
60 In addition, the Court considered the fact that the decision of 9 January 1995 was based 
on the examination which took place from 30 January to 4  February 1994, ie that it did 
not necessarily reflect the applicant’s current condition and thus did not respect the 
principle of the protection of individuals against arbitrariness with regard to any 
measure depriving them of their liberty.
61 Such a rule is also consistent with the idea of an economic analysis of law that the reduction 
of damages on the grounds of contributory conduct involves an incentive for the victim to 
take care, a goal which cannot be reached if the victim lacks any understanding of what 
harming others means, see Martm-Casals (fn 46) no 11; M Faure, Economic Analysis of 
Contributory Negligence, in: Magnus/Martin-Casals (fn 47) no 68 ff; HB Schäfer/A Schönen­
berger, Strict Liability versus Negligence: an Economic Analysis, in: F Werro/VV Palmer 
(eds), The Boundaries of Strict Liability in European Tort Law (2004) 40.
62  Since no one is under a legal duty not to cause damage to his own sphere and last but not 
least because the incapacity of the victim belongs to his own sphere and is therefore not 
attributed to the tortfeasor. See Martin-Casals (fn 46) nos 5, 8.
63 Austria § 1310 Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (ABGB); Germany § 829 Bürger­
liches Gesetzbuch (BGB); Switzerland art 54 SwCo; Turkey art 65 TBK.
64 See Magnus/Martm-Casals (fn 47) no 81.
65 Eg in Belgium, see art 1386 Code civil (CC).
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These rules are applied by analogy and the contributory negligence of 
mentally incapacitated persons is exceptionally taken into account. Hence, 
a reduction of damages on the basis of contributory conduct is also 
accepted with respect to persons who at first glance could not be held 
contributorily ‘negligent’ due to their lack of capacity.66
15/27 This line of argumentation is supported by the specific preconditions for 
liability under the Convention. As shown above and further detailed by 
Steininger/Wallner-Friedl,67 instead of subjective fault, the mere violation 
of the Convention rights by the respondent State suffices in most cases for 
the establishment of liability. At first glance this line of argumentation 
may be ascribed to an assessment of the victim’s situation since tortfeasor 
and victim may be seen as equal parties in the dispute. Hence, for ques­
tions of contributory conduct, wrongfulness on the side of the victim must 
be seen as decisive.68 In principle, this wrongfulness is not tied to the 
tortious capacity of the tortfeasor or -  in cases of contributory conduct -  of 
the victim69 and could accordingly be used as a reductive criterion in the 
assessment of damages. In particular when the victim has been convicted 
of serious criminal behaviour, his act of grave wrongfulness, ultimately 
leading to the infringement of his own human rights, could be considered 
in the assessment of damages.
15/28 These arguments, alongside the comparative observations, may seem 
dogmatically sound, but it should nevertheless be borne in mind that the 
guarantee of a fair and just trial is one of the absolute fundamental 
principles of justice and one of the founding ideas of the ECtHR, which it 
is therefore obliged to secure notwithstanding the applicant’s own wrong­
ful conduct. Hence, it is actionable to deprive someone who has been 
subjected to an unduly long review of his rights under art 6 (1) ECHR on 
the ground that he himself started the causal chain leading to the in­
fringement of his human rights.70
Accordingly, a criminal offence could not amount to contributory conduct 
since the damage the applicant suffered due to the infringement of 
procedural rights under the Convention is not a loss that the relevant 
criminal statute was designed to prevent. On the contrary, the purpose of 
the Convention rights is not the sanctioning of a criminal offence, but the
66 See Magnus/Martin-Casals (fn 47) no 81.
67 See Steininger/Wallner-Friedl (fn 33) no 8 /12  ff.
68 See Bydlinski (fn 25) no 2/196 .
69 Eg acts of self-defence against mentally ill persons or children are justified.
70 Dannemann (fn 1) 2 4 4  ff.
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protection of the afore-mentioned rights.71 Hence, if any reduction result­
ing from the gravity of the applicant’s wrongfulness had to be accepted at 
all, such a reduction must be absolutely exceptional.
D. Prohibition on Speculation
In Chevrol v. France72 the Court found a violation of art 6 ECHR in its 
judgment since the Conseil d’Etat allegedly deemed itself to be bound to 
the negative opinion of a non-judicial organ (the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs). The applicant sought an award of approximately € 3,000,000 for 
lost income for the time that elapsed during the legal actions. She also 
claimed € 100,000 in respect of the non-pecuniary damage resulting from 
the dispute and the destruction of her career.
The Court referred in its decision to the fact that it was not allowed to 
speculate on what the outcome would have been if the Conseil d’Etat had 
not based its decision solely on the Ministry’s opinion (non-speculation- 
formula), reduced the damages for pecuniary damage to nothing and 
awarded the severely reduced amount of € 17,000 for non-pecuniary 
damage.
This non-speculation-formula ultimately results in a situation where the 
applicant has to prove that if all procedural rights had been respected, the 
case would have been decided otherwise and the applicant would have 
suffered no loss. Obviously, such a proof is purely hypothetical and there-
71 Such an approach would be similar to the one recently taken by the ECtHR in Maslov v. 
Austria. The Court stated that the residence prohibition had a basis in domestic law and 
that it ‘pursued the legitimate aim’ of preventing disorder and crime. Nevertheless, 
given the nature of the offences which were non-violent and a result of juvenile 
delinquency, given the plaintiff’s good conduct following his release from prison the 
second time and given his lack of ties with his country of origin, the Court found that a 
ten-year residence prohibition appeared disproportionate to that ‘legitimate aim’. The 
Court concluded that there had been a violation of art 8 ECHR. For a complete under­
standing of the process, see ECtHR 22 .3 .2 0 0 7 , no. 1638/03. See also the dissenting 
opinions of Judges Loucaides, Vajic and Steiner.
72 ECtHR 13 .2 .2003 , no. 49636 /99 . The applicant, who had qualified as a doctor in 
Algeria, applied in France for membership of the local Medical Association in order to 
be approved for practising as a doctor in France. The authority in charge refused her 
application on the ground that, although she was a French national, her qualifications 
did not m atch the French medical qualification. The applicant subsequently filed 11 
further applications, which were all rejected. The applicant appealed against those 
decisions, failed again and finally filed her complaint with the French Conseil d’Etat. 
In its judgm ent the latter Court refused the application again, basing its decision on a 
non-binding statem ent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, due to a change of 
French laws the applicant was finally admitted to practise as a doctor in 1999.
15/29
15/30
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fore the applicant will not be able to provide such evidence in most cases. 
Thus, this rule must be clearly seen as a reductive approach in cases where 
the applicant’s injury is a result of the infringement of the Convention and 
subsequent failure by the respondent State.73
15/31 One might add that the non-speculation approach is in itself contradic­
tory: it suggests that the non-observance of human rights would have no 
implications for the outcome of the respective national proceedings.74 But 
procedural rights specifically guarantee a fair and just trial and, of course, 
the opportunity for the claimants to put forward their positions and 
objections. Hence, the non-observance of human rights should lead to 
the opposite inference, namely a prima facie assumption that the outcome 
was affected, so that the respondent State is obliged to provide sufficient 
evidence that the infringement of human rights did not impact the out­
come. On the basis of this evidence the Court may then decide whether the 
damage alleged by the applicant results from the infringement or not. 
Therefore, the ban on speculation could be replaced by a detailed analysis 
of causation75 instead of a reduction on the basis of the non-speculation 
formula.76
III. Conclusions
15/32 This paper represents the authors’ attempt to analyse the reduction of 
damages in the case law of the ECtHR: the authors first constructed some 
general paradigms and structures of possible reductions and sought sub­
sequently to identify these within the case law of the Court. To proceed 
vice versa would have left the authors with a more delicate set of results -
73 See Bydlinski (fn 25) no 2 /109  ff, M Kellner/IC Durant, Causation (contained in this 
volume) no 7/65 ff.
74 See Dannemann (fn 1) 117.
75 For a similar approach, see Büyüksagis (fn 2) no 904.
76 One should, however, note that the Court used the causation test in a recent case, in which 
the relatives of the deceased claimed a loss of their son’s earnings, and rejected the 
argument of the Turkish government according to which the method of calculation on 
which the applicants’ claims were based was not compatible with the Court’s practice and 
the amounts sought were highly speculative and imaginary. However, the Court did not 
grant damages to the applicants on the basis that there is no clear causal connection 
between the damage claimed by the applicants and the violation of the Convention. The 
Court stated that in the present case it is not established that the applicants were, in 
any way, dependent on Solomou’s future earnings. Therefore, the Court does not find it 
appropriate in the circumstances of this case to make any award to the applicants under 
this head’ . See ECtHR Solomou and Others v. Turkey, 24 .6 .2008, no. 36832/97, § 100.
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or (given the sheer mass of cases) in danger of failing to indicate any means 
which possibly lead to a reduction of damages.
As demonstrated initially, European legal systems have developed techni- 15/33 
ques to keep liability within reasonable and sustainable limits. Compared 
to the case law of the ECtHR it becomes evident that the Court also 
endeavours to apply such a limitation of liability; in the analysis above 
the authors tried to match the potentially significant techniques and 
reasoning of the Court with those in the European legal systems. This 
comparison is however confronted with some challenges since the ratio­
nales given by the Court as to when damages should be awarded and how 
they are measured or accordingly reduced are extremely concise and it is 
therefore difficult to draw definite conclusions, at least to the extent 
initially hoped for.
The cases presented are only a starting point, the tip of the iceberg for 15/34 
further discussion and only first impressions can be drawn: the general 
desire to reduce damages was clearly observable within the Court’s case 
law. The Court employs several techniques to this end although one has to 
admit that these techniques have not always been employed consistently.
Hence, the authors made an effort to each provide a different perspective 
on the interpretation of the cases; nevertheless, the mechanisms used to 
achieve a reduction of damages could have been considered more precisely 
if the Court tackled in greater detail the way in which it calculated the 
damages to begin with and then clearly set out the reasons why it reduced 
them. More precise substantiation of the relevant rationales would not 
only be particularly helpful to the subjects to the Convention but also to 
secure the uniformity of the Court’s case law.
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